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EDUARD HANSLICK’S FORMALISM AND HIS 
MOST INFLUENTIAL CONTEMPORARY CRITICS
Abstract: The paper deals with the formalistic view on music presented in Eduard 
Hanslick’s treatise On the Musically Beautiful, which is taken to be the founding 
work of the aesthtetics of music. In the paper I propose an interpretation of 
Hanslick’s treatise which differs on many points from the interpretations displayed 
in the works of several most influential contemporary aestheticians of music. My 
main thesis is that Hanslick’s treatise is misunderstood and incorrectly presented 
by these authors. I try to demonstrate this thesis by referring to Hanslick’s original 
formulations in the German edition and by showing that my interpretation renders 
Hanslick’s view far more coherent and his arguments successful in showing his 
main conclusions. Accepting this alternative interpretation should have further 
implications on many contemporary theories in the aesthetics of music that reckon 
on the failure of Hanslick’s arguments as presented by usual interpretations.
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Introduction
Eduard Hanslick is considered the founding father of the aesthetics of 
music. His treatise On the Musically Beautiful1 has had such a great impact on 
the understanding of music, that today, almost all of the authors who write about 
music from a philosophical perspective, especially about music’s relation to 
emotions, first state their attitude toward Hanslick’s view, and only then present 
and defend their own view. In contemporary literature on music, a distinction 
is made between the so-called Hanslickians and Hanslick’s critics, although all 
of them mostly reject all of his arguments. In this paper, I shall not deal with 
contemporary authors’ attempts to establish their own theories. Rather, I will 
focus on their interpretations of the treatise On the Musically Beautiful, since, 
in my opinion, that is where a more fundamental, and also more interesting 
point can be found. Namely, I will argue that Hanslick’s treatise (or „little book” 
1 I will comparatively follow Geoffrey Payzant’s translation: Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically 
Beautiful, trans. Geoffrey Payzant, Indianapolis, 1986. (in further text – OMB), for it is this 
translation that contemporary authors refer to, and Ivan Foht’s translation: Eduard Hanslik, O 
muzički lijepom, pr. Ivan Foht, BIGZ, 1977. (in further text – OML), because it is more faithful 
to the original than Payzant’s, which partly engages in interpreting the text. In addition, I 
will provide parts of the original text when mentioning contentious or key terms: Eduard 
Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, 13.–15. Auflage, Leipzig, 1922. (in further text – VMS).
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as it is called by some of these authors) is superficially read by these authors, 
and mostly misunderstood. This fact should reflect considerations that follow 
from the mentioned misunderstanding. In this paper, I shall offer a more 
precise reconstruction of Hanslick’s argumentation. After that, I shall present 
interpretations of Hanslick’s view by several most influential contemporary 
authors, followed by a demonstration that there is a discrepancy between these 
interpretations and the text of the treatise. The aim of the paper is to prove a 
possibility of a different interpretation of Hanslick’s treatise, which I consider not 
only to correspond to the text of the treatise better, but also to present it as more 
coherent than other interpretations do.
Firstly, I will try to explain the so-called negative thesis, which is what 
Hanslick is most occupied with in his treatise. Explicitly, Hanslick only writes 
that his negative thesis „first and foremost opposes the widespread view that 
music is supposed to ‘represent (darstellen) feelings.’„2 In elaboration and 
demonstration of this thesis, Hanslick will examine other relations of music and 
feeling, relations that will be more interesting to the contemporary aestheticians 
of music. Contemporary authors do not follow Hanslick’s line of argumentation, 
but rather directly go in for the assertions and conclusions that they are interested 
in. However, I will here hang on to Hanslick’s course of exposure, since I believe 
his work to be far more coherent than it seems at first, and also that neglecting 
the relations between certain arguments easily leads to misunderstanding of 
Hanslick’s assertions and intentions.
While the explicit statement of the negative thesis does not say much, broadly, 
the thesis includes critique and rejection of then widespread apprehension of 
music, which Hanslick ironically names „the emotional aesthetics.” It is a view, 
which, according to Hanslick, attributes a double role to emotions in the art of 
music: firstly, that the arousal of emotions is what defines music and the purpose 
of music (Zweck und Bestimmung); secondly, that emotions are the content of 
music, „that which musical art represents in its works.”3 Hanslick rejects both of 
these roles, and his arguments against them constitute the negative part of the 
treatise. In the next section, I will discuss what exactly Hanslick means by these 
two roles and how he dismisses them. First, I shall consider how the definition 
and purpose of music should be understood.
The first role: (aroused) as the defining purpose of music
Considering this role, music is understood from a functionalist point of 
view: fulfilling a certain unartistic function or purpose (such as the arousal of 
emotions) is the specificity of music – it is what music does and what determines 
it as music. At the same time, fulfilling of this purpose is what music is supposed 
2 See OMB, p. xxii, OML, p 36–7. I will accept represent the correct translation of the term 
darstellen. Hanslick explicates this term as following: to represent is to produce a clear and 
distinct content, to «put» (or present) it «before» our very eyes (»daher stellen«) – see OMB, 
p. 14, OML, p. 66. Contrary to Payzant’s translation of this term as represent, contemporary 
authors mostly speak of expression or expressiveness, which Hanslick names as ausdrücken 
throughout the whole treatise.
3 See OMB, p. 3, OML, p. 41–2.
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to do, a task it has to accomplish. This, as it turns out, descriptive-normative 
definition (since it includes what music de facto does, as well as what it should 
do) is not formulated explicitly within some elaborate theory. It was only a part 
of a then widespread way of thinking about music, and about art in general. 
Hanslick does not go into details of such thinking (which he considers to be very 
vague), but rather dismisses it completely.
Hanslick first rejects the normative component of the definition: he claims 
that beauty has no purpose at all, for beauty is mere form, i.e. a shape in which 
something appears, which by itself has no purpose.4 Although something that 
is beautiful can be applied to many purposes, and even used solely for a specific 
purpose, this purpose is not what makes the thing beautiful, i.e. the thing is not 
beautiful because some intention or purpose is realized.5 Beauty, in Hanslick’s 
view, is in the thing that is beautiful, and which remains beautiful „even if no 
feelings are aroused and even if it be neither perceived nor thought.”6
Stating that the arousal of emotions is what defines music means that arousing 
human emotions is specific for music, and differentiates it from other arts. 
Hanslick’s objection is simple: emotions are aroused not only by other arts, but also 
by various non-aesthetical preoccupations (Hanslick’s examples are rhetoric and 
religious fervour), and by everyday events as well.7 Hanslick does not see how can 
in principle music be differentiated from other arts by arousal of emotions.8
Furthermore, although works of arts do stand in some kind of relation to 
our emotions, none of them stands with in an exclusive relation to emotions. In 
other words, art is not exhausted in its connection with human emotions.9 Is it 
only one of many aspects of music, and therefore, insufficient for defining it.
4 It is easier to understand this statement in connection with the explanations Hanslick gives 
later in the text, when he compares artistic and natural beauty or when he compares music 
with arabesque and kaleidoscope: the beauty in all those examples is in the form itself, 
independent of what is formed or shaped. This means that beautiful objects are beautiful due 
to their formal properties, that is, the properties accessible by sensory perception. In the case 
of both artistic and non-artistic objects, beauty concerns the order or harmony of the parts of 
the object, while any possible purpose of the object does not affect its beauty.
5 See OMB, p. 3, OML, p. 42. Hanslick will explain what does make a beautiful thing beautiful 
in the positive thesis.
6 Ibid.
7 See OMB, p. 5, OML, p. 45.
8 One possible answer that Hanslick mentions is that the difference is in the manner of arousal: 
that music arouses emotions directly, as opposed to other arts where the arousal is mediated 
by conceptual content. However, Hanslick objects to this by explaining that the arousal 
caused by listening to music is also multiply mediated starting with sensations, imagination 
and so on. Feeling is nothing more than a secondary effect of music – as well as of other arts 
– see OMB, p. 4, 5–6, OML, p. 43, 45–46. Music does stand out in its effect on the feelings 
because it affects us more rapidly and intensely than other arts. Hanslick demonstrates 
further in the treatise that this difference is physiologically conditioned and does not arise 
from the artistic aspect of music, but rather from its material that is in a certain relation with 
our physiological organisation. Therefore, this effect cannot be something that is artistically 
specific of music – see OMB, p. 50–1, OML, p. 118–9.
9 See OMB, p. 6, OML, p. 46.
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Hanslick proposes additional reasons against such defining, which 
demonstrate how uncertain and variable the relation between music and the 
emotions aroused by it is. Firstly, our thoughts and emotions elicited by music 
are often guided by titles, texts and other merely incidental associations of ideas 
(especially in church, military and theatre music), which we often wrongly 
ascribe to the music itself. Besides, the relation between an art of music and 
our mood changes is also determined by our changing musical experiences and 
impressions. Hanslick asserts that nowadays we can scarcely understand how 
some earlier generations of music listeners could regard some particular music 
sequence as a precisely corresponding expression (Ausdruck) of a particular 
feeling. He supports this assertion by citing „the extraordinary difference 
between the reactions of Mozart’s, Beethoven’s and Weber’s contemporaries 
to their compositions in different historical periods. He concludes that the 
way feelings will be aroused by music depends on the circumstances of each 
particular instance.10
After this, Hanslick makes an additional remark, that throughout this 
variation in the reactions to music, the musical value of the works themselves 
remains unaltered. This leads Hanslick to conclude that the effect of music upon 
feelings possesses neither the necessity nor the constancy nor the exclusiveness 
(in relation to the value of the musical work) which a phenomenon would have 
to exhibit in order for us to base the criteria for work’s value on it. Thus, Hanslick 
rejects not only the view that the aroused emotions define music, but also the 
view that the arousal of emotions can be the criteria for value (i.e. aesthetical 
principles) of musical works.
The second role: emotions as the content 
(which should be) represented by music
From the differences among human senses, to which the arts are bound, 
follow the fundamental differences in the way the various arts shape their 
products (i.e. the difference of their forms), and from that, further, follows the 
diversity of content among the arts. Every particular art has its own range of 
ideas which it represents in its own form of expression, with its own means of 
expression (Ausdrucksmitteln), e.g., tones, words, colours, etc. Hanslick claims 
that an artwork embodies a certain idea as beauty in sensuous appearance.11 In 
other words, by these means of expression an artist externalizes or embodies 
an artistic idea in such a way that the idea appears to our senses as something 
beautiful, as a beautiful form.
The view that Hanslick rejects is the belief that the whole range of human 
feelings is the content of music, that these feelings are the ideas music acoustically 
10 See OMB, p. 6–7, OML, p. 47–8. Hanslick also notes that, while Mozart’s music was described 
by his contemporaries as passionate and struggling as opposed to the tranquillity and 
wholesomeness of Haydn’s works, the same comparison was made just a few decades later 
between Mozart and Beethoven.
11 See OMB, p. 8, OML, p. 55.
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embodies in shaping its works. According to this view, tones and their artistically 
shaped relations would be mere raw material, the means of expression by which 
the artist represents human feelings. Hence, what we enjoy in music and what 
has an effect on us is not the melody and the harmony we are listening to, but 
the feelings they signify (bedeuten).12
Hanslick’s statement, which will be under many attacks in later philosophical 
works, is the claim that music is not able to represent definite feelings.13 In order 
to demonstrate that, he proposes the following arguments:
In the first argument, Hanslick claims that what is specific for a feeling, what 
renders it a definite feeling, and hence is the criterion by which we are able to 
extricate and discern it from other feelings, is its conceptual content, a number 
of conceptions and judgments (Vorstellungen und Urteile) which are associated 
to the concept of that feeling. Therefore, e.g., „the feeling of hope cannot be 
separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with 
the present,” or „love cannot be thought without the representation of a beloved 
person, without desire and striving after felicity,” etc.14 Without this conceptual, 
cognitive apparatus, all that remains is an unspecific stirring, a general state of 
well-being or distress, and the intensity and oscillations which are not specific 
for the feeling (because different feelings can have the same intensity and 
oscillations, and, also, the same feeling can vary in its intensity). It is not clear 
how pure instrumental music could be able to convey or reproduce concepts 
or representations, for they are not within the scope of music.15 Since the 
specification of the feelings cannot be separated from their conceptual content, 
and since music cannot reproduce (wiedergeben) concepts, Hanslick concludes 
that music cannot represent specific feelings.16
The second argument states that the only aspect of feelings music is capable 
of representing, since it is the aspect they both share, is the dynamic aspect, the 
dynamic flow of experiencing a feeling. Music can imitate (nachbilden) only 
the motion of a physical process, the characteristic way of motion. Motion is 
something both music and feelings share, but it is only one aspect of feeling, 
which, as said already, can be shared by different feelings, and also vary in one 
feeling, since the same feeling does not always have the same dynamics. Hence, 
dynamics cannot be specific for a feeling.17 Therefore, since the only aspect of 
feelings which music can represent is not specific for any feeling, it follows that 
music cannot represent specific feelings.
The argument I propose as the third one emphasizes that the ideas of 
specific feelings cannot appear or be embodied in instrumental music because 
12 See OMB, p. 8–9, OML, p. 56.
13 See OMB, p. 9, OML, p. 56, VMS, p. 22: „Die Darstellung eines bestimmten Gefühls oder 
Affektes liegt gar nicht in dem eigenen Vermögen der Tonkunst.“
14 See OMB, p. 9, OML, p. 57.
15 See OMB, p. 10, OML, p. 58.
16 See OMB, p. 9, OML, p. 57–8.
17 See OMB, p. 11, OML, p. 60–1.
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there is no necessary (notwendiger) connection between those ideas and certain 
combinations of musical tones. I take this to mean that there is nothing in 
the tones themselves and in their combinations which would necessarily or 
unambiguously refer to feelings.18 This was just a statement Hanslick mentioned 
within the argument concerning the dynamics. However, I identify it as a 
separate argument because I take it as implicitly stating that, because of lacking 
the so-called „necessary” connections, music cannot present its tone structures 
as structures relating to feelings. It cannot present its dynamic flow as the flow 
of a feeling.19 Therefore, even though music can successfully imitate certain 
aspects of feelings, it has no means to connect those aspects unambiguously 
with a feeling. In other words, the connection between music and feelings always 
stays in our open interpretations.
In the forth argument, Hanslick appeals to the empirical testing of the thesis 
that music can represent feelings. However, I consider that, at the same time, he 
points out a certain weakness of the emotional aesthetics and all similar theories, 
and that is the justification for ascribing any particular emotional content to an 
artwork. Namely, says Hanslick, if someone considers that music indeed can 
represent feelings, let him try to demonstrate, with arguments, which feeling 
constitutes the content of an artwork.20 If we should ask the listeners of the most 
popular musical works at the time, from Mozart to Chopin, to name the feeling 
they consider to be the content of the work, there would, in Hanslick’s opinion, 
be different answers (e.g. love, yearning, piety).21 As well as there could be no 
demonstration of why any of the answers would be correct, nobody could refute 
any of them, either.22 Therefore, there is not only the discrepancy about which 
feeling is represented by some musical work, the fact is that we do not even have 
at our disposal the means – the reasons, by which we could choose the right 
answer to what is the content of the work.23
In the fifth argument, Hanslick turns to the representation of feelings in 
vocal music as well. First of all, it should be noted that for Hanslick, the relation 
18 Ibid.
19  Malcolm Budd later explicated this argument (See Malcolm Budd, Music and the 
Emotions: The Philosophical Theories, London, 1985. p. 24.), and Steven Davies took this 
explication over as an addition to the rest of Hanslick’s arguments which refutes all attempts 
at crossing the gap between music and the emotions (see Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning 
and Expression, Ithaca NY, 1994. p. 217–9.).
20 See OMB, p. 12, OML, p. 62–3.
21  Earlier in the treatise, Hanslick mentions different documented descriptions of the same 
compositions and notes that the listeners have had different opinions about which sequence 
of tones were adequate expressions for which feeling. See OMB, p. 6–7, OML, p. 47–8.
22 See OMB, p. 14, OML, p. 65.
23 See OMB, p. 14, OML, p. 65–6. The argument supposes Hanslick’s sense of representation as 
exposition of a content in a manifest manner. Thus it is understandable that Hanslick does 
not see how we can designate something as what an art represents, when the it is the very 
dubious and ambiguous element of that art, perpetually subject to debate. Also, this lack of 
reasons (which would support the ascription of any emotional content to a composition) 
is connected to the previous argument, that is, with the lack of the necessary connection 
between tone groups and definite feelings. 
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between music and the text in a vocal composition is such that music alone 
with its assets has the power only to enhance, revive, or colour the content of 
the text. But what is represented in a vocal work is determined by the text, not 
by the music.24 Hanslick claims that music is not determined enough so that 
it could represent feelings in a determinant way, thus the same melody might 
just as appropriately be played along some words with a very different, even 
the opposite meaning. Hanslick substantiates this with a number of examples. 
Namely, concerning Gluck’s opera Orpheus and Eurydice, a contemporary of 
Gluck remarked that, in the Orpheus aria (which moved many of the listeners to 
tears), „one could just as well or, indeed, much more faithfully set the opposite 
words to the same tune” (that instead of „I lost my Eurydice,” the words say „I 
found my Eurydice”).25 Hanslick himself remarks in addition to this that „music 
certainly possesses far more specific tones for the expression of passionate 
grief ”26 and emphasizes that he picked this example intentionally, first, because 
Gluck „has been atributed the greatest exactitude in dramatic expression and, 
second, because over the years so many people have admired in this melody the 
feeling of intense grief which it expresses in conjunction with those words.”27
What was true for these smaller parts of musical works, Hanslick continues, 
applies to the whole compositions as well. Many whole vocal compositions have 
used different texts with the same music. Hanslick lists a number of examples: 
ouverture to Mozart’s The Magic Flute is often performed as a vocal quartet 
of quarrelsome Jewish shopkeepers, and Mozart’s music, with not a single 
note altered, suits the low-comedy words surprisingly well; in many German 
provincial churches sentimental love songs are performed during the celebration 
of the Mass; in Italian churches, also, popular wordly tunes of Rossini, Bellini, 
Donizetti and Verdi are played, and they do not at all disturb the devotions of 
parishioners, but, on the contrary, inspire them even more; many of the most 
famous pieces in Hendel’s Messiah, including the ones most admired for their 
godly sentiments, are taken from the secular and mainly erotic duets which 
Handel composed earlier; the madrigal-like pieces in J. S. Bach’s Christmas 
Oratorio were transcribed from altogether dissimilar secular cantatas; Gluck, 
who is considered to has achieved great dramatic truth in his music only by 
fitting each note precisely to the specific situation, in Armida transcribed five 
pieces from his earlier Italian operas.28 These examples lead Hanslick to conclude 
that if music itself were capable of representing a specific feeling, say, devotion, 
24 See OMB, p. 16, OML, p. 67.
25 See OMB, p. 17, OML, p. 67–8.
26 See OMB, p. 18, OML, p. 69. I believe that this passage shows Hanslick’s attitude toward the 
issue of music’s expressiveness. It is clear in the passage that he thinks that melodies and 
other musical elements or passages can be suitable for the expression of feelings, but not in 
a way in which they would be tied to the expression of only one particular feeling. The same 
melody could express several different, even disparate feelings. In other words, Hanslick 
takes musical elements to be indefinitely expressive.
27 Ibid.
28 See OMB, p. 18–19, OML, p. 69–72.
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as its content, such a quid pro quo would be as impossible as if the preacher 
could substitute his sermon with reciting a novel or a page of parliamentary 
transactions.29
The beauty and the representation of feelings in music
After the exposition of the arguments which demonstrate that music cannot 
represent specific feelings, Hanslick further considers the possibility that the 
representation of feelings is an ideal for music which it can never achieve, but 
which it can and should strive to approach.30 This would mean that the beauty 
of music resides in the representation of feelings in the degree in which such 
representation is possible. Hanslick proposes arguments which refute such a 
possibility by taking the counterfactual point of view: let us imagine that musical 
representation of definit feelings is possible so we could show that the degree of 
exactitude with which music represents them does not coincide with the beauty 
of the artwork.31 Hanslick tries this fiction with vocal and not instrumental 
music, since instrumental music by itself automatically excludes the possibility 
of identifying definite feelings, whereas in vocal music the feelings allegedly 
represented are indicated by the text. The words in vocal music determine what 
is being represented and what is being revived by music in tonal motion.32 If 
we suppose that musical representation of feelings is possible and that the 
exactitude of the representation coincides with the beauty of the artwork, 
then we should consider those compositions which accomplish that task most 
specifically (bestimmtesten) the most beautiful.33 However, firstly, everyone 
knows of musical pieces we evaluate as works of utmost beauty which have no 
such content (e.g. the preludes and fugues of J. S. Bach). Secondly, there are, 
opposed to these, vocal compositions which try to portray a specific feeling 
(within the limits just explained) and in which truth of portrayal has precedence 
over any other principle, and, yet, which do not possess a great degree of beauty. 
The third argument against the same thesis states that in a vocal composition 
we can make many small alterations, which, without weakening the expression 
29 See OMB, p. 18–19, OML, p. 70.
30 See OMB, p. 21, OML, p. 74.
31 Ibid. 
32 See OMB, p. 21–2, OML, p. 75. Contemporary interpreters consider this transition to the 
examples of vocal music as a problem for Hanslick, so I will try to further explicate this 
passage and reconstruct what might have been Hanslick’s motivation for making that choice. 
Namely, so far Hanslick was speaking solely about the instrumental music (since, as he 
says, we may only say that music can do of what instrumental music, with no help from 
non-musical means, can do), and he was demonstrating that it cannot represent definite 
feelings. Now, for the sake of the argument, he supposes that the music in vocal pieces can 
represent feelings (that is, he imagines that representing the dynamic aspect is sufficient for 
the representation of definite feelings) which are the content of the text. The text enables us 
to identify what is being represented by the music and we can thus judge to what extent was 
the representation successful.
33 See OMB, p. 22, OML, p. 75.
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of feeling, yet immediately destroy the beauty of musical themes. This would be 
impossible if the beauty consisted in the exactitude of expression of feelings.34 
Therefore, we can make changes in one aspect without affecting the other.
The supposed thesis cannot explain this mismatch and Hanslick concludes 
that we cannot identify the beauty in music with the exactitude of representation 
of feelings. They are separate principles, since musical beauty demands an 
autonomous content, whereas the representation subordinates the beauty to 
non-musical factors.35 The principle of autonomous beauty and the principle of 
representation any non-musical content are, therefore, two separate principles. 
In addition, in recitative we have separately the principle of musical beauty and 
the declamatory principle (adjusting the music to sound like speech), in opera 
the well-known struggle between between the principle of dramatic realism and 
that of musical beauty, just as in dance and ballet there is a struggle between 
the dramatic principle and the principle of plastic and rhythmic beauty.36 In all 
these art forms, we can see different principles and each of them has its own 
demands, which go in different directions. By this Hanslick tries to sort out the 
specifically musical (or formal) principle from all the other principles we might 
equate it with. The musical principle is directed towards forming autonomous 
musical beauty.
Hanslick further tries to explain what beauty in music really is and what it 
consists of if not in representation or arousal of feelings. This constitutes the so-
called positive thesis.
Formalistic definition of the beauty in music
Hanslick defines the beauty in music as specifically musical kind of beauty: 
beauty which, irrespective of some non-musical content, consists solely in 
tones and their artistic combination.37 Hanslick’s formalism is apparent in that 
he considers the content of music to be the form of music itself. In addition, 
he bases the criterion of beauty on the form of music, which I will elaborate 
bellow. Namely, the material (Material) out of which the composer creates – the 
substance of music – is tones, with their latent possibilities for melodic, harmonic 
and rhythmic variety. The content, i.e. what is expressed by means of this tone-
material, is musical ideas, or tone-ideas, not some non-musical ideas concerning, 
say, feelings, which would then have to be translated to the tone-language.38 The 
form, consisting of tone structures of the composition, is a realized artistic idea, 
or the embodiment of the content. The relation between content and form is not, 
34 See OMB, p. 26, OML, p. 81. At this point Hanslick speaks of representation and expression 
interchangeably, because his focus is on showing the difference between musical and any 
other non-musical principle (which involves both representation and expression of feelings).
35 See OMB, p. 22, OML, p. 76.
36 See OMB, p. 22–3, OML, p. 77–8.
37 See OMB, p. 27–8, OML, p. 81–3.
38 See OMB, p. 28, OML, p. 83–4.
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as is typically thought, the translation of an idea into some medium disparate 
from it. It is, rather, a relation of gradual elaboration, detailed development to 
the final form.39 Since tone-ideas – ideal tone structures – are the content of 
music, the content of a composition is inseparable from its form (because the 
form also consists in tone structures).40 In other words, the tone structures we 
hear in a composition express just ideas of those same tone structures, because, 
as Hanslick says, „music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only 
tones.”41 All this is implicitly contained in Hanslick’s definition of the content of 
music as „tonally moving forms.”42 I would add that in this definition Hanslick 
also succinctly included the time dimension of music: music forms do not stand 
motionless, they move through time by the successive sounding of tones they 
are made of, or, in Hanslick’s words, they come into being „in continuous self-
formation before our eyes.”43 This tone motion does not convey any other, non-
musical content as is ordinarily believed, and the beauty in music is the beauty 
of these tone-forms themselves. In order to make his point clearer, Hanslick 
gives examples of such purely formal beauty, beauty with no content from the 
outside: arabesque, kaleidoscope, and later he adds works of architecture, dance, 
human body and natural beauty such as a landscape, a leaf or a flower. All these 
examples, Hanslick notes, also possess some kind of primitive beauty of outline 
and colour, setting outside any expression or non-musical content. Hence, formal 
aspects of all of them rest on the same basis, but unlike others, with the exception 
of architecture works, musical works are produced by artistic endeavors and 
express the ideas of the artist.44 For that reason, we have a different relation to 
formal beauty in music then to the beauty of non-artistic objects. This leads us 
to, in my opinion, the key point of Hanslick’s view on music and musical beauty, 
which is completely neglected in many, especially contemporary interpretations. 
Namely, musical beauty is, for Hanslick, defined dually: first, concerning only 
our senses, as acoustical beauty in analogy with just mentioned visual examples, 
39 See OMB, p. 28, OML, p. 83–4: “A musical idea turns up in the rough in the composer’s 
imagination; it takes shape progressively, like a crystal, until imperceptibly the form of the 
completed product stands before him in its main outlines.”
40 See OMB, p. 80, OML, p. 171: “But in music we see content and form, material and 
configuration, image and idea, fused in an obscure, inseparable unity.” and “In music there is 
no content as opposed to form, because music has no form other than the content.”
41 See OMB, p. 8, OML, p. 55, and OMB, p. 78, OML, p. 167. Also: Music says everything the 
composer wanted to say – see OMB, p. 37–8, OML, p. 100.
42 „Der Inhalt der Musik sind tönend bewegte Formen“ – see OMB, p. 29, 101–2, OML, p. 
84. The literal translation would be that the content of music are soundingly moving forms. 
However, it should be noted that Hanslick consistently throughout the treatise uses the word 
“ton” in the sense of tone, and not sound (for this he uses the term “Klang”), see OMB, p. 
102. Therefore, soundingly is not an entirely adequate translation of Hanslick’s tönend, since 
it omits the difference between a tone and a sound. Alternatively, the content of music could 
be defined as “forms moved by the sounding of tones,” or, simply, as “tonally moving forms,” 
which makes Payzant’s final choice.
43 OMB, p. 29, OML, p. 84: “(...) in fortwährender Selbstbildung vor unsern Augen entstehend.”
44 See OMB, p. 29, OML, p. 84–6.
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and, second, concerning the artistic aspect and the art of shaping tone material, 
as artistic value of embodied musical ideas, or externalized tone forms.
The first component – sensuous beauty of tone forms – is determined by 
certain fundamental laws of nature, which govern the external manifestations of 
sound and interrelations of all musical elements, and also the human organism 
(e.g. which frequencies of sound we hear as pleasant, what we hear as harmony 
and what as disharmony of tones etc.). These (negative, as Hanslick names them) 
regularities, which are inherent in the tonal system due to the laws of nature, 
are the basis for further capacity of tones for entering into the so-called positive 
content of beauty, which in fact constitutes the artistic aspect of musical beauty.45
The realization of artistic ideas is achieved not through linking tones 
mechanically into a series, but by spontaneous work of the composer upon the 
tone material, the artistic structuring of tone relationships. The artistic value of 
the ideas thus realized is the second component of musical beauty. Hanslick does 
not give details about what exactly makes a composition artistically successful, 
but only emphasizes that it always concerns the form of the composition. 
Artistic ideas and artistic treatment of the material are immanent in the form: 
tone structures we hear in music are realized artistic ideas themselves, and in 
listening to the tones, we are able to follow the artistic acts of the composer, 
which can be successful or unsuccessful, and thus we can evaluate them in terms 
of their artistic value.46
Musical beauty, therefore, consists in the artistic value and acoustic beauty 
of a formed (or, realized) tone idea.47 This dual definition of beauty is reflected 
also in Hanslick’s claim that we notice musical beauty (it „makes itself known in 
aesthetical awareness”) immediately, by itself, through the harmony of its parts, 
and without reference to any factor external to the harmonious form of music,48 
but, unlike contemplating the beauty of non-artistic objects, in listening to music 
we do not stay on the surface of its sensuous aspect. Artistic beauty is designed by a 
creative mind, and we, thus, in the structure of the composition and in the beauty 
of that structure, consciously follow the ideas, or the artistic acts of its creator.49
45 See OMB, p. 30–1, OML, p. 88. Hanslick already noted that specifically musical beauty must 
not be understood as simply acoustic beauty (which musical beauty often contains, but 
cannot be reduced to), nor as an ear-pleasing play of tones, see OMB, p. 30, OML, p. 87. It 
is clear that he does not take the term beautiful in the usual sense, and that by it Hanslick 
understands not only the sensuous, but also the artistic aspect of music.
46 See OMB, p. 31, OML, p. 88–9.
47 Hanslick’s including of acoustical pleasure into his understanding of beauty is also evident 
when he cites Grillparzer’s comments on the ugly, or unbeautiful, where he claims that, as 
opposed to poetry, music cannot make use of the ugly in its works, since the impression of 
music is received and enjoyed directly from sensation, so the understanding’s approval comes 
too late to compensate for the intrusion of the ugly. “Hence Shakespeare can go all the way to 
the hideous, but Mozart has to stay within the limits of the beautiful.” – See fn 18, OMB, p. 
31, OML, p. 186.
48 See OMB, p. 32, OML, p. 90.
49 See OMB, p. 60, OML, p. 133–4: The second component, or the „ideal content,“ as 
Hanslick says, can be understood only by the cultivated listeners, while the first component 
is characteristic for the pleasure of the naive audience that exists in every art. Hanslick 
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Describing music in terms relating to emotions
The formalistic definition exposed in previous passage leads us to the next 
significant point of Hanslick’s view on music. Namely, when we speak about 
music, we describe it in various ways, but mostly by using terms that relate to 
non-musical phenomena, especially feelings. Hanslick was not only well aware of 
this, but was often describing music in that way himself. In addition, he explained 
why we have the tendency to use these terms when describing music, and why 
this phenomenon does not have the significance we are inclined to ascribe to it.
Firstly, Hanslick claims that the content of music cannot be expressed in 
words or subsumed under concepts: music has sense and logic, but musical 
sense and musical logic. Music is „a kind of language we speak and understand 
yet cannot translate.”50 Therefore, it is extraordinarily difficult to describe this 
specifically musical: purely musical content and specifically musical beauty. 
Since music has no prototype in nature to imitate, and expresses no conceptual 
content, Hanslick claims that it can be talked about only in technical definitions 
or figuratively – „What in every other art is still description is in music already 
metaphor.”51 Thus we say, for example, that one particular musical conception 
is, taken by itself, witty, while another is banal, or sounds impressive, or insipid. 
Hanslick emphasizes that we quite rightly describe a musical theme as majestic, 
graceful, tender, dull, hackneyed, but all these expressions describe the musical 
character of the theme.52 This means that by describing music in such ways, we 
are not talking about the feelings of the composer, or the feelings that would be 
the content of the theme. We are talking about the impression the combination 
of musical factors used in that theme makes.53 In order to describe musical 
characters, we often choose terms from the vocabulary of our emotional life, 
such as arrogant, peevish, tender, spirited, yearning. However, we can also take 
our descriptions from other realms of phenomena and speak of fragrant, vernal, 
hazy, chilly music. Feelings are thus, for the description of musical characters, 
only one source among others which offer similarities (Ähnlichkeit).54 Thus, 
consideres both of these approaches as legitimate, aesthetical approaches (since the listeners 
direct their attention on the artwork and its details), as opposed to the so-called pathological 
reception which involves a passive enjoyment only in the general impression of the piece and 
in the feelings wafting through it.
50 See OMB, p. 30, OML, p. 87.
51 OMB, p. 30, OML, p. 86.
52 See OMB, p. 32, OML, p. 90.
53 See OMB, p. 32–3, OML, p. 91–2. If the impressions and descriptions of musical 
compositions were uniform, then, even if the descriptions were merely figurative, it might 
indicate an objective connection between the tone groups and non-musical phenomena. 
However, Hanslick has already shown that the impression of the composition (and hence the 
description as well) in some way or another is, even in the same listener dependent on the 
previous musical experiences, on non-musical associations (titles, programs, etc.), as well as 
on various other factors. Therefore, describing music in the mentioned way by all odds is not 
uniform, but to a great extent diverse and variable.
54 See OMB, p. 32, OML, p. 90–1. It seems that this passage is somewhat ambiguous since Hanslick 
does not explain what he means by the term similarities. Budd is inclined to understand it as 
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Hanslick believes that describing music in terms relating to non-musical 
phenomena does not imply the existence of some objective relation between 
music and those phenomena, whether it is feelings, weather conditions, or 
phenomena of some other realm. It is proper to use such descriptions, which 
we even cannot do without, provided we never lose sight of of the fact that we 
are using them only figuratively. We may say, for instance, that a musical theme 
sounds gloomy, but we should take care not to say it portrays arrogance, or that it 
is an expression of the gloomy feelings in the composer etc.55 Such descriptions 
indicate the effect a composition has due to its musical factors, or the combination 
of musical elements in it. In addition, Hanslick notes that since the individual 
musical elements already possess their own characteristic expressiveness, the 
predominant characteristics of the composer, such as sentimentality, energy, 
serenity etc. will be revealed through his „partiality toward certain tonalities, 
rhythms, transitions, in accordance with the prevailing impulse which the music 
is able to reproduce.”56 However, Hanslick stresses in another passage that, 
although there is, of course, a connection between the character of every piece of 
music and the character of its author, this connection, firstly, in not visible to the 
aesthetician, and, secondly, the comparison of the characters of musical pieces 
and their authors is infinitely complicated and will be more prone to fallacies, 
the stricter the causal connection it seeks to establish.57
I consider it obvious, especially in the last passage, that Hanslick did not 
support the radical position which is usually ascribed to him. Moreover, his 
view on the relation between music and emotions is compatible with the views 
of contemporary authors who claim to disagree with him. I believe that the 
key difference between Hanslick’s and their views is actually the difference in 
emphasis. Namely, in the treatise On the musically beautiful, Hanslick’s main 
intention was to refute the claims of those who were, in his opinion, actively 
dynamic similarity since dynamic is the only aspect that Hanslick says is common for music 
and feelings – see Budd, op. cit, p. 31. However, I wish to offer an explanation according to 
which Hanslick does not presuppose a real similarity between music and other phenomena: 
a common aspect such as dynamics, which enables us to describe music by using words 
in their literal meaning (rapid, slowly, etc.). Hanslick himself says that when we describe 
music, we mostly use figurative speech. I, however, take this figurative use to be a use of the 
words in what Wittgenstein would call their secondary meaning – see Ludwig Wittgentstein, 
Philosophical investigations, Basil Blackwell Ltd 1958, p. 216. This kind of use is exemplified 
when we use the term “warm” to describe sounds (e.g. the sound of flute), colours (yellow), 
even smells (the smell of vanilla). The term “warm” is clearly not used in its basic – literal – 
meaning, but we also would not be inclined to say this is a metaphor which could somehow be 
unraveled: what we are trying to say by using these kinds of descriptions we cannot say in any 
other way but with that exact term. Likewise, music cannot literally be melancholic, fragrant, 
or chilly, but neither can those descriptions be reduced to the descriptions containing some 
other terms with no loss of sense. This is consistent with Hanslick’s statement in the same 
passage that we cannot do without these descriptions. I believe that this is the way Hanslick 
implicitly understands descriptions of music by using terms concerning emotions, as well as 
weather conditions and other kinds of phenomena.
55 See OMB, p. 32, OML, p. 91, and OMB, p. 47, OML, p. 113.
56 See OMB, p. 47, OML, p. 112.
57 See OMB, p. 39, OML, p. 102
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misleading the listeners, who then would not be able to recognize the most 
essential aspect of music – the music itself, or the art of shaping tone material. 
Hence, Hanslick displaces emotions aside: we should focus on music, and not 
the emotions, regardless of the way they relate to music. Contemporary authors, 
on the other hand, emphasize the relation between music (regardless of how 
it is defined) and the emotions, and consider the importance of emotions in 
our reception of music. Contemporary authors do not notice that unspecific 
emotional expressiveness of music is indeed compatible with the main intention 
of Hanslick’s treatise. Here I shall end my interpretation of Hanslick’s view. 
Further, I will expose the interpretations of the same treatise, made by several 
most influential contemporary music aestheticians, and then try to demonstrate 
why those interpretations should be refuted.
Contemporary interpretations of Hanslick’s view
Contemporary authors mostly write about the negative part of Hanslick’s 
treatise, and interpret only his arguments against the so-called emotional 
aesthetics. I believe that their reconstruction of Hanslick’s arguments and 
conclusions is incorrect, in interpreting both the arguments alone, as well as the 
relations between the arguments and the conclusions. I shall not go into every 
detail of their interpretations, but, rather, try to prove my thesis on several points 
I consider most relevant.
According to Malcolm Budd, Hanslick tries to establish three negative 
conclusions about the relationship between music and the emotions. The first 
one states that it is impossible for any definite emotion to be represented by a 
piece of music, and, hence, that the musical value, the „beauty”, of a piece of 
music is never dependent on representing emotions by music.58
Budd only presents one of many Hanslick’s arguments for this conclusion – 
the conceptual content argument. Budd reconstructs this argument as following: 
music cannot represent thoughts, and definite emotions contain or involve 
thoughts; therefore, music cannot represent definite emotions.59 Budd mentions 
that, in this argument, Hanslick stresses that definite emotions are distinguished 
from each other only by the thoughts they contain, that every other feature of 
an emotion can be shared with others. However, it seems that Budd takes what 
is contained in the emotion as the key point of the argument.60 Accordingly, 
he takes the argument to depend on the theory of emotions we adopt, on how 
we understand the notion of representation, on the idea of one phenomenon 
containing or involving the other, and also upon the validity of the principle 
that if one thing involves another thing then in order for something to represent 
the first thing it must represent the second thing.61 I believe that, by putting 
58 See Budd, op. cit, p. 20 Budd takes Hanslick’s musically beautiful to be equivalent to the value 
of a musical piece.
59 Ibid, p. 21.
60 Ibid, p. 22.
61 Ibid, p. 21–4.
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emphasis on what emotions contain instead on how they are distinguished 
from each other, Budd made this argument more complicated than it is, and 
rendered it dependent upon the considerations upon which, it seems to me, it 
does not depend. Contemporary authors use a different view on emotions to 
try to examine or refute this argument. Hanslick, however, does not engage in 
any serious theoretical consideration concerning what emotions are exactly, 
what they involve etc. He supposes, on an intuitive level, what may be specific 
for particular emotions, and how they can be distinguished from each other 
(among other, by the listeners whom music would represent emotions to), and 
what of all that can music represent, or imitate. Although it may seem that 
this argument would have been more convincing if it had been grounded on 
a theory of emotions, I believe that its strength actually lies in the fact that it is 
formulated in this way, more on an intuitive than on a theoretical level. I shall 
try to demonstrate this point further in the paper, in the exposition of Jenefer 
Robinson’s interpretation of the same argument.
Budd then presents three arguments for the first main conclusion – that 
the value of a composition would not depend upon their being accurate 
representations of definite emotions, even if such representation were possible.62
The first argument is that some valuable pieces of music do not represent a 
definite feeling. Budd’s objection to this argument is that it counts only against 
the stronger view that each valuable work represents definite emotions and its 
musical value is in some way dependent upon this function. It leaves untouched 
the view that the value of some music pieces is a matter of music’s representing 
definite emotions. However, it is Budd’s formulation of the conclusion that 
changes the point of the argument, and renders it unsuccessful. Hanslick does 
not, in fact, speak about the relation of dependence, but about a relation of 
congruence between musical beauty and the representation of feelings, and this is 
supported by the text of his treatise.63 When the conclusion is formulated so that 
it states that musical beauty and the exactitude of the representation of feelings 
do not coincide, and that the former does not consist in the latter, the argument 
becomes successful.
The second argument concerns the alleged inverse proportion between the 
beauty of music and the exactitude of the representation of feelings by music. 
In Budd’s version, Hanslick claims that vocal music, as it represents feelings 
more perfectly (in the sense of succeeding to represent them), becomes musically 
less beautiful. Since this turns to contradict Hanslick’s own belief that such 
representation is impossible, Budd tries to save the argument by interpreting 
62 Ibid, p. 25.
63 See OMB, p. 21, OML, p. 74: “Even if it were possible for feelings to be represented by music, 
the degree of beauty in the music would not correspond (kongruieren) to the degree of 
exactitude with which the music represented them. Let us for the moment, however, suppose 
that it [the representation of feelings] is possible and consider the practical consequences.” 
The arguments that follow are, in fact, designed to show the incongruity of musical beauty 
with the representation of feelings, not the independence from it. Budd, on the other hand, 
does not leave a reference for his formulation of the conclusion, but it is clear that he refers to 
the same passage.
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Hanslick as saying that as the words represent definite feelings more accurately, so 
the music becomes less beautiful.64 This formulation does indeed avoid creating 
a contradiction, but, unfortunately, does not make much sense either. Budd 
actually does not notice that Hanslick does not speak about the degree to which 
music succeeds in representing a feeling, but rather about the degree to which 
music was tailored to representation, or adjusted so that it fits some non-musical 
idea, and how much it was, on the other hand, composed only with musical 
beauty in mind. I consider this to be inverse proportion Hanslick mentions. On 
top of that, this was not even an argument that was supposed to prove anything, 
but rather a passing comment about vocal pieces that were mostly dedicated to 
the musical portrayal of feelings.65
The last argument for the same conclusion concerns the slight alterations 
that can be made to the music in any song, which do not affect the accuracy of 
the representation of feelings at all, but which destroy the beauty of the theme. 
According to Budd, all that Hanslick intends is merely that the reference made 
by the words of the song to the particular emotions will always remain, while the 
overall beauty of the piece is affected. This does not succeed in supporting what 
Budd takes to be Hanslick’s thesis: that the value of a composition never depends 
on the representation of emotions by music.66 In my interpretation, on the other 
hand, this actually is a successful argument, since it shows that it is possible that 
the accuracy of musical expression of the content of the text – within the limits 
of representing the dynamic aspect – remains the same, while the beauty of the 
music is changed. This does support what I take to be Hanslick’s conclusion: 
that musical beauty of a composition and the accuracy of representation (or, 
as in this case, expression) are not the same thing. This interpretation not only 
renders Hanslick’s argumentation far more sensible, but also accords more with 
other Hanslick’s claims.67
Hanslick’s second conclusion concerns the arousal of emotions. According 
to Budd’s interpretation, Hanslick here rejects the arousal of emotions as an 
aesthetically relevant relation between music and emotions. Budd’s objection is 
that Hanslick fails to recognize the distinction between the so-called musical and 
extra-musical emotions, that is, the emotions which have the music as their object 
(e.g. being impressed by a composition), and emotions which have an object 
64 See Budd, op. cit, p. 26.
65 See OMB, p. 22, OML, p. 76: “(...) there are vocal compositions which try to portray a specific 
feeling with the greatest accuracy, within the limits we have just explained, and in which 
truth of portrayal has precedence over any other principle. Upon closer examination, the 
outcome is that even the most relentless fitting of music to feeling in such a musical portrait 
generally succeeds in inverse proportion to the autonomous beauty of the music (...)”
66 See Budd, op. cit, p. 26–7.
67 See OMB, p. 21–22, OML, p. 75. When discussing this very group of arguments, Hanslick 
mentions that “music has the power to animate the object, to comment, and to bestow upon it 
in greater or lesser degree the expression of individual subjectivity. It does this as far as possible 
through the characteristics of motion and through exploitation of the inherently symbolic 
aspects of tones.” Hanslick’s counterfactual approach in these arguments consists in supposing 
that dynamic representation is sufficient for musical representation of a definite feeling.
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aside from music (e.g. being sad over some event while listening to music). Budd 
considers it unnecessary to deny, as Hanslick does, that an extra-musical emotion 
can be experienced in an aesthetic response to music in order to maintain the 
doctrine of the specifically musical nature of the beauty of music.68 I believe 
that here also Budd misses some Hanslick’s statements which clearly show that 
he did recognize the existence of the so-called musical emotions.69 This is most 
obvious in the chapter in which he explains the difference between an aesthetic 
and non-aesthetic reception of music. Hanslick rejects as aesthetically irrelevant 
only those emotions that are aroused in passive listening to music, during which 
we do not focus on the music itself.70
Budd believes that the third way it might be thought that music can be 
related to an emotion in an aesthetically significant manner is by music’s being 
expressive of an emotion or by music’s possessing an emotional quality.71 
Denying that describing music as proud, longing, etc. implies an aesthetically 
relevant relation between music and the emotions is, according to Budd, 
Hanslick’s third negative conclusion. Hanslick allegedly tries to defend this 
conclusion by stating that descriptions of music that contain emotional terms are 
either improper or deletable.72 Budd then explains why Hanslick is mistaken to 
claim that emotional terms are deletable when they are used this way,73 and on 
top of that stresses that it is unclear how this figurative use of words is supposed 
to work, for the only analogy Hanslick allows between an emotion and a piece of 
music is their dynamic features, and yet neither feature that Hanslick mentions 
as an example is not a dynamic feature (longing, fresh, etc.).74 I take that the 
mistake in Budd’s interpretation is in misunderstanding Hanslick’s statement 
that, when we describe music, just as we use the terms concerning emotions, 
68 See Budd, op. cit, p. 27, 30–1.
69 For example: “Far be it from us to want to underestimate the authority of feeling over music. 
But this [aroused] feeling, which in fact to a greater or lesser degree unites itself with pure 
contemplation, can only be regarded as artistic when it remains aware of its aesthetic origin, 
i.e., the pleasure in just this one particular beauty. If this awareness is lacking, if there is no free 
contemplation of the specifically musical beauty, and if feeling thinks of itself as only involved 
in the natural power of tones, then, the more vigorously the impression makes its appearance, 
all the less can art ascribe such impression to itself.” See OMB, p. 58, OML, p. 131–2.
70 According to Hanslick, the aesthetical significance of a response to music does not depend 
on whether emotions are aroused, but rather on whether it involves active and aware 
observing, perceiving of the specificities of the work, the awareness of the beauty of the work 
and listening to the piece only for its own sake, or, on the contrary, passive enjoyment in the 
general character of the piece, without noticing its specificities, as well as listening to the 
piece for the sake of enjoying one’s own emotions that do not take music as their object – 
OMB, p. 63–6, OML, p. 141–5.
71 See Budd, op. cit, p. 31.
72 Ibid, p. 32. By improper descriptions Budd means that their use involves an essential 
reference to the emotions, and by deletable that they can be replaced by sets of terms drawn 
from different realms, which would serve exactly the same purpose. These other sets are in 
turn deletable in favour of purely musical, that is, literal, characterizations.
73 Ibid, p. 31–5.
74 Ibid, p. 31.
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„we can also take our descriptions from other realms of appearance,” as meaning 
that there is no special reason why, say, „sad” should be used to stand for some 
property, since the term is no more appropriate than many other words.75 I 
interpret the same sentence to mean that we generally describe music by using 
terms concerning various realms of phenomena, and so that emotional terms 
are simply not the only set of terms we use to describe music. According to my 
interpretation, Hanslick does not take the descriptions which contain emotional 
terms to be deletable, but rather believes that some descriptions of music can 
contain terms concerning emotions, while others can contain terms concerning 
weather conditions or some other realms of phenomena, and that descriptions 
themselves do not imply some special relation between music and those 
phenomena in any of the realms. Therefore, since emotional terms are not the 
only set of terms we use to describe music, there is no reason to believe that the 
mere fact that we describe music using emotional terms could imply that music is 
in some aesthetically relevant relation only with emotions. My interpretation, as 
opposed to Budd’s, not only renders this passage coherent with other Hanslick’s 
statements, but also has more support in the text of the treatise.76
Another significant intepreter of Hanslick’s statements is Peter Kivy, who 
considers Hanslick’s intentions so unclear that he dedicated a whole paper to 
figuring out what Hanslick even tried to deny in his treatise. Kivy’s interpretation 
is supposed, among other things, to patch up many apparent contradictions that 
arise between the arguments of the negative thesis and the rest of the treatise. 
Kivy states that there are three clearly discernible arguments that weave in and 
out of Hanslick’s negative thesis (although, because of the vagaries of Hanslick’s 
style, he allows the possibility of there being more arguments), and all three are 
directed against the possibility of representation of emotions by music.77
The argument Kivy marks as the first one was, in my interpretation, 
concerned with the justification for ascribing any particular emotional content 
to an artwork. Kivy, however, names it „the argument from disagreement” and 
presents it as follows: if music could represent emotions, there would be general 
agreement on what, in any given instance, a piece or passage of music represents. 
However, since, according to Hanslick, there is complete, chaotic disagreement, 
music cannot sensibly be thought to represent emotions.78 Kivy refutes this 
argument by claiming there is no such disagreement. Besides oversimplifying 
this argument, Kivy fails to notice the already mentioned consequence of some 
possible disagreement: that if any two listeners disagree on which emotion is 
represented by a composition, the music itself does not provide a criterion 
75 Ibid, p. 33.
76 See OMB, p. 32, OML, p. 90–1: “Feelings are thus, for the description of musical characteristics, 
only one source among others which offer similarities. We may use such epithets to describe 
music (indeed we cannot do without them), provided we never lose sight of the fact that we 
are using them only figuratively and take care not to say such things as ‘This music portrays 
arrogance,’ etc.”
77 See Peter Kivy, ‘What was Hanslick Denying’, The Journal of Musicology, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1990), 
pp. 3–18, p. 6. (in further text WWHD)
78 Ibid, p. 7.
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for determining who of them is correct. Because there is nothing in the tones 
themselves that would unambiguously point out to some definite emotion (in 
Hanslick’s words, „there is no necessary connection”), there is nothing we can 
use to justify the decision. Hanslick does not claim there is a „complete, chaotic 
disagreement” on what is the content of musical compositions, but rather that 
the issue of music’s emotional content would be much simpler and more evident 
if music could represent definite emotions. I believe that this version of the 
argument has more strength than Kivy’s version, and also puts forward a much 
more interesting observation than it would if it was merely noting a statistical 
fact about the agreement or disagreement of the listeners. On top of all this, my 
version is supported by Hanslick’s explicit mentioning of justifying and refuting 
attribution of emotional content to musical compositions.79
The second argument concerns the re-use of music by the composers to set 
the texts of disparate emotive content or tone. Kivy presents it as an argument 
trying to demonstrate that, since in those cases the disparity between the old 
music and the new text is not perceived, it follows that music must be emotively 
„neutral”.80 Kivy takes Hanslick’s statement that we can imagine a dramatically 
effective melody which is supposed to express anger, but might also just as 
effectively suit words expressing the exact opposite, say, passionate love, to mean 
that every vigorous melody well suited to passionate anger is always well suited 
(on the same account) to passionate love.81 I believe that this interpretation 
oversimplifies the argument, and presents the conclusion incorrectly. It turns out 
that, in Kivy’s version, Hanslick claims something that is clearly false (that music 
is emotively neutral) and contradicts his own descriptions of music, and, on top 
of that, uses the examples that quite obviously do not prove his point. In addition, 
there are passages in the treatise which evidently show that for Hanslick music 
can be more or less expressive of some emotions, but even when it is expressive to 
a great extent, it is still insufficient for the achievement of one definite emotion.82 
According to my interpretation, Hanslick characterizes music as emotively 
indefinite, rather than neutral. This is the conclusion that he (successfully, I 
believe) supports with examples of the same music suiting texts with a different 
emotional content. Moreover, my version of the argument is coherent with 
the rest of the treatise. This passage is related to Hanslick’s statement that 
Gluck could have chosen tones more specific for the expression of passionate 
grief for Orpheus’ aria.83 Kivy dedicates another paper to the clarification of 
79 See OMB, p. 12–14, OML, p. 63–65.
80 Kivy, op. cit, p. 8.
81 Ibid, p. 8–9. Kivy easily refutes this version of the argument by giving a counterexample – 
a musical passage that would not suit the words expressing love as it suits the words that 
express anger.
82 See OMB, p. 18, OML, p. 69: “(...) music certainly possesses far more specific tones for the 
expression of passionate grief.” Also: “But even far more specific and expressive (bestimmtere 
und ausdrucksvollere) passages of vocal music will, when separated from their texts, at best 
only allow us to guess which feelings they express. They are like silhouettes whose originals 
we cannot recognize without someone giving us a hint as to their identity.”
83 See OMB, p. 17–8, OML, p. 67–9.
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this statement, since it does not fit his interpretation of Hanslick’s view on the 
expressiveness of music.84 In this paper, Kivy tries in many ways, but with no 
success, to fit this statement with the rest of his interpretation of Hanslick’s view, 
and ends by concluding that Hanslick was simply being incoherent.85 I believe 
that this reaffirms that Hanslick’s view is not only more coherent, but also easier 
to understand in my interpretation.86
The third argument is the already presented argument concerning the 
conceptual content of emotions. In Kivy’s version, this argument demonstrates 
the impossibility of musical representation of emotions based on what 
emotions are and how they are ordinarily aroused. After noting that a good 
deal of Hanslick’s view on emotions is „murky,” Kivy supposes that Hanslick 
probably wanted to say that, since music cannot represent in sufficient detail 
the situations in which emotions are normally aroused, it cannot be thought 
to represent emotions. To this Kivy objects that the two claims clearly are not 
equivalent.87 Kivy’s interpretation not only renders this argument unclear and 
quite bad, it is also not supported by the text of the treatise. When speaking 
of the conceptual content, Hanslick does not mention the situations in which 
emotions are aroused, but rather the conceptions and thoughts which appear in 
association with the emotion, during the occurrence of the emotion, although 
Hanslick adds that they can appear also unconsciously. Because of the latter, I 
am inclined to take the conceptual content as also the conceptions and thoughts 
we ordinarily associate with the concept of an emotion.88 Thus, according to 
my interpretation, the conceptual content is not the situation which arouses the 
emotion, nor is it necessarily in the consciousness of the person undergoing the 
emotion, but rather it is something we are inclined to associate with the emotion, 
or with the concept of that emotion. Jenefer Robinson, as well as Kivy, interprets 
this argument with the emphasis on the theory of emotions, especially on the 
84 See Peter Kivy, ‘Something I’ve Always Wanted to Know About Hanslick’, Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 46 (1988), p. 413–17.
85 Ibid, p. 416–7.
86 In order to show that this argument indeed succeeds in demonstrating the so-called emotive 
indefiniteness, I want to add that Hanslick emphasizes that he selected this example out 
of many, “first, because it concerns the composer – Gluck – to whom has been attributed 
the greatest exactitude in dramatic expression and, second, because over the years so 
many people have admired in this melody the feeling of intense grief which it expresses 
in conjunction with those words.” It is clear from this that the melody which would much 
more suit the expression of one emotion was evidently very successful for the expression of 
another, completely different emotion – see OMB, p. 18, OML, p. 69.
87 Kivy, WWHD, p. 9–10.
88 Hanslick did not explicitly formulate the statement that conceptual content is not solely a 
part in the experience of emotion, but also the content we are usually inclined to associate 
with the concept of the emotion. However, I believe that this statement can still be ascribed 
to him, since it renders his argumentation more coherent, which I will substantiate further in 
the paper.
 For the passage that goes against Kivy’s interpretation, see OMB, p. 9–10, OML, p. 57–8: 
“Only on the basis of a number of ideas and judgements (perhaps unconsciously at moments 
of strong feeling) can our state of mind congeal (verdichten) into this or that specific feeling.”
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arousal of emotions: Hanslick anticipates the judgement theory of emotions, 
according to which judgement is an essential component of the emotion, and the 
emotions are caused by a judgement. Her version of Hanslick’s argument is that 
music cannot represent definite feelings because it cannot represent the specific 
representations or concepts that define particular emotions.89 Robinson believes 
this argument is refuted solely because psychology and neuroscience reject the 
theory of emotions she believe is the basis of this argument by showing that 
the judgement occurs in the later part of the emotion process.90 I do not want 
to engage in questioning how occurring of the components of emotions in a 
different order affects the definition of emotions, but rather just restate my belief 
that discussions between different psychological theories do not have a significant 
impact on the validity of Hanslick’s argument. Hanslick does not specify what 
exactly he believes emotions are, what they consist of, how they arise or proceed. 
Robinson herself notices that Hanslick’s view on the music’s influence on out 
moods can be compatible with the results of psychological research she relies 
on, and which allegedly refute the cognitive theory of emotions.91 Therefore, I 
believe that, whichever theory of emotions we choose, we distinguish between 
the emotions primarily in the way Hanslick (in my interpretation) claims. This 
makes refuting any background theory of emotions by itself insufficient for the 
rejection of Hanslick’s argument.92 It should also be noted that this is the only 
argument Robinson presents, and the only one other authors take to posses 
certain strength as well.
Steven Davies too mentions it as the only somewhat convincing argument.93 
In his detailed review of the literature on music concerning musical meaning 
and the expression of emotions by music, Davies presents other Hanslick’s 
arguments as well, but this is consisted almost solely in combining Budd’s and 
Kivy’s interpretations.94 Since Davies does not give any significant original 
contribution to the reconstruction of Hanslick’s argumentation, I do not find it 
necessary to present parts of his review, but I think it should be noted that Davies’ 
89 See Jenefer Robinson, Deeper than Reason, Oxford NY, 2005, str. 295.
90 Ibid, p. 3, 7–8. These surveys have, according to Robinson, showed that emotions are 
processes in which a special kind of affective appraisal induces characteristic physiological 
and behavioral changes, and only afterwards is this succeeded by the so-called “cognitive 
monitoring” of the situation.
91 Ibid, p. 462, fn 7.
92 Therefore, instead of redefining the emotions (since this may leave the assumptions of the 
argument untouched), one should rather try to refute this argument by showing there is 
something besides the conceptual content that can be determinant for a particular emotion 
(that music can convey), that is, by finding some other criterion for distinguishing emotions.
93 See Davies, op. cit, p. 209.
94 Ibid, see p. 152–3. for the argument on eliminability of the descriptions of music involving 
emotion related terms (taken over from Budd); p. 203–208. for the argument on the relation 
between music and text (taken from Budd and Kivy); 209–221. for the main argument 
about the conceptual content (taken from Budd); p. 246–9. for the so-called argument from 
disagreement (taken from Kivy); p. 281–283. and 289–291. for the interpretation of Hanslick’s 
view on the arousal of emotions (taken from Kivy).
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book at least indicates the acceptance and the influence of the interpretations 
presented in this paper.
Conclusion
I hope, first of all, that in this paper I succeeded in presenting a clear 
reconstruction of Hanslick’s view on music – a reconstruction that renders his 
statements comprehensible and coherent, and thus in presenting Hanslick as a far 
better philosopher than contemporary interpreters give him credit for. Moreover, 
this would justify his role in the history of aesthetics in terms of philosophical 
significance, and not solely due to the fact that no one has hitherto had a serious 
approach to the aesthetics of music.
Due to the space limit, I was not able to expose all the details of contemporary 
author’s interpretations of Hanslick’s view. Nevertheless, I consider the material 
presented in this paper substantiated and sufficient for showing that it is not 
the fact that these interpretations contain some minor misunderstandings, but 
it is rather the whole argumentation that is misinterpreted. On the one hand, 
this renders their rejection of Hanslick’s argumentation understandable, but, on 
the other hand, it indicates the possible need for a reconsideration of the same 
arguments, that is, the version of the arguments in which they are substantiated 
and coherent with each other.
I hope as well that I succeeded in the main intention of this paper, namely, 
to demonstrate that contemporary aesthetics of music (more precisely, the part 
of it that deals with the relation between music and the emotions) rests on the 
misinterpretation of Hanslick’s statements, which should have an impact on the 
alleged refutations of those statements, and also on the soundness of the theories 
that count on the incorrectness of Hanslick’s argumentation.
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